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NOTICE
The Wyoming Law Journal was recently notified that Shepard's
Citations now include citations to cases and statutes as cited in the
Wyoming Law Journal. This additional service begins with volume 9 of
the Wyoming Law Journal and may currently be found in the red cumulative issue of Shepard's Wyoming Citations for 1956.

NOTES
IMPLIED REVOCATION OF WILLS IN WYOMING
The law of wills early provided for their revocation by implication
because of certain changes in the circumstances of the testator. The status
of this doctrine of implied revocation, in the light of Wyoming's statutes
and decisions, will be the purpose of this note. Our legislature, in granting
the statutory right to make a will, did not set forth a complete scheme
governing the exercise of that right, and where that completeness is want-

ing, in the field of implied revocation, the courts revert to the use of the
old common law rules in order to interpret legislation and the intention
of a testator. Therefore, a brief look at the common law doctrines is a
point of beginning.

[112]

NOTES

The common law recognized two instances wherein a testator's will
was revoked when, after making his will, he had undergone certain
changes in his domestic status.' One was marriage plus birth of issue in
the case of the male testator.2 The underlying theory was that the average
male testator, in view of these changes, would be presumed to have desired a different disposition of his property from that indicated in his
will.3 The courts of that day were finally to hold this presumption to be
a conclusive presumption because at that time other forms of revocation
were being subjected to a strict interpretation of the law, and also the
enactment of the Statute of Frauds gave the courts some difficulty in
justifying implied revocation. 4 Marriage of the testator alone, after he
executed his will, would not revoke it as the wife was not an heir and
anyhow the wife's security was provided for in the form of dower.' Nor
would birth of issue by itself work a revocation of the father's will executed
subsequently to his marriage, since after marriage he must be presumed
to have contemplated the birth of children and to have made his will
with reference thereto. 6
The other instance wherein the will was revoked at common law was
in the marriage of a femme sole. 7 "This part of the doctrine was based
on the theory that the same degree of capacity was required to revoke a
will as to make one; that since a married woman was not able to make a
will she could not revoke one made before marriage; and that, therefore,
unless the marriage itself revoked the will it would be irrevocable during
coverture."s
These two rules have frequently been spoken of as "the doctrine of
implied revocation" by reason of a change in domestic relations of the
testator. Though these rules might be referred to more properly as
"applications" of this doctrine rather than as the doctrine itself, it is
nevertheless true that they set forth in general the only changes in domestic
relations which would work at common law an implied revocation of a
will.9 Courts differ in their view of the doctrine-some hold that the
doctrine is restricted to the two rules because the legislature in expressly
providing for implied revocation had in mind only those two rules. 10
Other courts, Wyoming included, hold the doctrine to be elastic enough
to meet new changes viewing the application of the doctrine as did Chancellor Kent: 1 ".
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
H1.

.

. when the occurrence of new social relations and moral

Page, The Doctrine of Implied Revocation of Wills by Reason of Change in
Domestic Relations of the Testator, 5 Wis. L. Rev. 387 (1930).
E.g., Doe d. Lancashire v. Lancashire, 5 T.R. 49, 101 Eng. Rep. 23 (1792).
Lugg v. Lugg, 2 Salk. 492, 91 Eng. Rep. 497 (1700).
1 Page on Wills 933 (3rd Ed. 1941).
Wellington v. Wellington, 4 Burr. 2165, 98 Eng. Rep. 129 (1768).
Doe d. White v. Barford, 4 Mau. & Sel. 10, 105 Eng. Rep. 739 (1815).
Hadsden v. Lloyd, 2 Bro. C.C. 534, 29 Eng. Rep. 293 (1789).
1 Page on Wills 948 (3rd Ed. 1941).
1 Page on Wills 930 (3rd Ed. 1941).
Vanek v. Vanek, 104 Kan. 624, Pac. 240 (1919).
4 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 521 (12th Ed., Holmes, 1873).

A'VX.OM1I[NG

LAW JOURNAL

duties raises a necessary presumption of a change of intention in the
testator."
Even after the enactment of the Statute of Frauds,12 which declared
that no devise should be revocable except by certain acts, "any former law
or usage to the contrary notwithstanding," the common law courts continued to apply the doctrine of implied revocation on the ground the
statutes applied only to intentional revocation, and did not preclude
4
revocation by operation of law. 13 Then in 1837 the Statute of WAills'
cut short the life of this doctrine by expressly forbidding its use in England.
Modern statutes in the various jurisdictions have met some of the
problems of implied revocation and, depending upon the language, may
take the particular circumstances so legislated upon out of the application
of implied revocation and allow that change to effect an absolute revocation. According to a recognized authority on wills, "These statutes have
been divided into five general classes, viz.: (1) those dealing with the
effect of marriage; (2) those dealing with the effect of birth of issue; (3)
those dealing with the effect of divorce; (4) those which expressly exclude
any common-law doctrine of revocation; and (5) those which contain
express saving clauses as to implied revocation."' 5
Wyoming, with eleven other states,1 6 expressly recognizes the doctrine in its statute in this typical language: ".... excepting only that nothing
contained in this section shall prevent- the revocation implied by law from
'
subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator."'
Many jurisdictions without any statutory expression allowing for implied
revocation, yet providing that wills shall be revoked by such acts as
burning, tearing, etc., have resorted to implied revocation on the same
reasoning that permitted its use under the Statute of Frauds, viz., the
statute was intended to cover only intentional revocation, and does not
preclude the use of the doctrine of implied revocation.18 Therefore,
statutory approval of the doctrine has apparently not been necessary to
its application.
However, other statutory provisions have altered the application of
the doctrine. Statutes which conferred upon married women the capacity
to make a will and also to hold property, have by such enactments abolished
the reasons which justified the common law rule that a woman's will was
revoked upon her marriage, and by so destroying the reason for the rule
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.

29 Car. II, c. 3, § 6 (1677).
40 Mich. L. Rev. 406, 407 (1942).
7 Win. IV & I Vict., c. 26, § 20 (1837).
Page, The Doctrine of Implied Revocation of Wills by Reason of Change in
Domestic Relations of the Testator, 5 Wis. L. Rev. 387, 400 (1930).
Del. Rev. Code § 3715 (1935); Me. Rev. Stat. c. 155, § 3 (1944); Mass. Gen. Laws
c. 191, § 8 (1932); Mich. Comp. Laws § 702.9 (1948); Minn. Stat. § 525.19 (1949);
Nebr. Rev. Stat. § 30-209 (1943); Nev. Comp. Laws § 9912 (1929) ; N. H. Rev. Laws
c. 350, § 14 (1942); Ohio Code § 10504.47 (1936); Vt. Rev. Stat. § 2829 (1947);
Wis. Stat. § 238.14 (1951).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 6-306 (1945).
Pascucci v. Alsop, 82 App. D. C. 12, 147 F.2d 880 (1945); cert. den. 325 U.S. 868.
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Also, statutes dealing with the prethey have destroyed the rule itself.'
termitted child and/or the afterborn or posthumous child are expressions
of the policy of that particular jurisdiction, and in such jurisdictions,
the court, not being burdened with the problem of protecting such child,
can look to the other circumstances of the case to determine whether or
not the doctrine of implied revocation should be applied.
Today, with the increasing frequency of divorce, the legislatures and
courts are vitally concerned with the problem of the effect that divorce
has on the doctrine of implied revocation. On account of the infrequency
of divorce, there was no early common law decision on whether a divorce
revoked a will. 2 0

Divorce, in most states, does not of itself operate as a

revocation, 21 but where it is coupled with a property settlement there is
a conflict of authority. Where a property settlement accompanies the
divorce and the wife gets her share the court need not be concerned with
a desire to protect her from disinheritance and can give more attention to
other circumstances that may be present, i.e., whether or not the decree of
divorce caused the parties to become as strangers to each other. 22

When

courts are concerned over the length of time between divorce and the death
of the testator, as affecting the application of implied revocation of a
will executed prior to the divorce, 23 the cases reflect a modern trend in
that courts will now consider competent evidence to prove the testator's
actual intent. Divorce is the only change in circumstances that will revoke
24
a will in the Model Probate Code.
To further pursue the various statutory limitations in vogue today in
other states on the use of this doctrine is beyond the scope of this article,
yet the statutes referred to do form a background in presenting the doctrine
of implied revocation as it is applied in Wyoming.
While the Wyoming statute expressly recognizes revocation implied by
law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator, it does not specify the changes that will effect a revocation. Nor are
the changes as set out at common law controlling because the common law
"as modified by judicial decision" and "not inconsistent with the laws of
this state" was adopted as "the rule of decision of this state" as of the year
1607 2 -about one hundred years before the first decision (according to
Consequently, Wyoming's
our Supreme Court) implying a revocation.2
court is "at liberty to follow any of them (the common law decisions) or
19.

In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677 (1940).

20.

Atkinson on Wills, 431 (2nd Ed. 1953).

21.

In re McGraw's Estate, 228 Mich. 1, 199 N.W. 686, 37 A.L.R. 308 (1924); Baacke v.
Baacke, 50 Neb. 18, 69 N.W. 303 (1896).
Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W. 699, 35 Am. St. Rep. 545 (1893).
E.g., in re Arnold's Estate, 60 Nev. 376, 110 P.2d 204 (1941).
Simes and Basye, Problems in Probate Law 83 (1946). The editors feel that
marriage should not constitute a revocation since a surviving spouse can elect to

22.
23.
24.

25.
26.

take against the will and afterborn children are deemed to be fully protected by
statutes giving them an intestate share in their model probate code.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 16-301 (1945).
Overbury v. Overbury, 2 Show. 242, 89 Eng. Rep. 915 (1694).
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rest our decision upon the fundamental principle underlying all of them."2

7

The changes that worked a revocation at common law have been held
to be the only changes by some states, 28 while the majority have extended
the doctrine to other circumstances, 29 interpreting the doctrine as being
an elastic rule of law allowing a conclusive presumption of revocation to
arise whenever new social obligations are created in the domestic situation
of the testator. 30 The conclusiveness of the presumption of revocation
depends on the reason behind the application of the doctrine. If, in the
case of marriage, or birth of issue, the reason for revoking the will is to
protect the spouse or child from disinheritance, then the presumption
must be made conclusive in order to effectuate this policy. 3 In the case
of divorce and property settlement there is no need to protect the spouse
and so where such changes in circumstances have occurred they have been
declared to work an absolute revocation. Any evidence that the testator
meant his will to stand as written will not be received. 32 So once a court
concedes that a particular change is, in a particular case, sufficient to work
a revocation of a prior will, it is bound to say that this change of circumstances will constitute revocation in all cases. This has led to extreme
33
applications.
In the seventy-five years that the Wyoming court has had statutory
permission to revoke wills by operation of law, only three different circumstances have been presented to it for judicial decision. Said decisions
do not reflect a disposition on the part of the court to establish set rules
as were developed in the common law. Rather each case depended upon
the circumstances, and from consideration of those circumstances the
court did not strictly adhere to the common law doctrine. This leaves
the testator in a quandry as to what "change of circumstances" will effect
a revocation of his expressed intention.
The effect of a subsequent marriage on a will was considered in
Naab v. Smith. 34 The circumstances there prompted the holding that
marriage of a woman following execution of her will devising her property
to her children of a previous marriage did not, by implication, revoke it.
The decision, noting our statutory provisions granting to married women
the right to hold and devise property, has followed the majority rule on
this subject. The will of a male testator followed by his second marriage
was revoked in Johnston v. Laird,3 , but the circumstances there also involved an annulment of his first marriage coupled with a property settle27.

Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 52 P.2d 1219, 1220 (1935); In re Smith, 55 Wyo.
181, 97 P.2d 677, 681 (1940).

28.
29.
30.

Hertrias v. Moore, 325 Mass. 57, 88 N.E2d 909 (1949).
Karr v. Robinson, 167 Md. 375, 173 At. 584 (1934), afterborn issue alone; In re
Martin's Estate, 109 Neb. 289, 190 N.W. 872 (1922), divorce and property settlement.
40 Mich L. Rev. 406, 409 (1942).

31.

40 Mich. L. Rev. 406, 416 (1942).

32.

In re Battis, 143 Wis. 234, 126 N.W. 9 (1910).

33.
34.
35.

Nutt v. Norton, 142 Mass. 242, 7 N.E. 720 (1886).
NAAB v. Smith, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677 (1940).
Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 52 P.2d 1218 (1935).
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ment, so it cannot be said that the Wyoming court considered marriage
of a male testator to be a sufficient basis for revocation by operation of
law. However, the proposition that marriage alone is not sufficient is
36
well supported by courts in other jurisdictions.
As the difference between a divorce and an annulment of marriage is
37
too small for the application of a different principle, the Johnston case
may possibly be cited as holding that when a divorce is coupled with a
settlement of property rights between the parties, the change of circumstances is such as to impliedly revoke the husband's will. It is indicated
by the court in this case that they will consider every fact38 that seems
relevant in showing the changed circumstances in each case.
All states, except Wyoming, have statutes which provide either for
the afterborn or for the pretermitted child.

In Burns v. Burns39 the

testator provided for his wife and three children, subsequently a son was
born and the will remained in effect without change for 42 years thereafter. The after-born son was not allowed to share equally with the other
children. Our Supreme Court, after considering both the common law
rule that birth of issue alone would not revoke a prior will and the pretermitted heirship laws of other states, decreed that in view of the particular facts of this case, the pretermitted heirship policy did not apply in the
40
State of Wyoming. There was a pretermitted heir in In re: Ray's Estate
who was not allowed to share in his father's estate, and the court refers to
the Burns case as holding that a pretermitted child in a will was not
entitled under existing W\yoming law, to any part of the estate of its father.
The court in these two cases does not distinguish between a child born
after the will was executed and the child who was born before. In either
case the child was not allowed to share, and the court based its decisions
on the right of the testator to bestow his bounty upon anyone he may
choose, subject only to statutory limitations, and the court specifically
pointed out that Wyoming has no such limitations as regards these
children.
The adopted minor child in Wyoming has the same rights of person
and property as a natural child or heir at law of the person adopting him,
unless the adoption agreement provides otherwise. 41 The adopted child
will inherit as if he were in the blood stream of the family into which
he is adopted, and therefore may inherit from other members of the family
in addition to inheriting from his foster parents. 42
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Should the adoption

Ward's Will, 70 Wis. 251, 35 N.W. 731, 5 Am. St. Rep. 174 (1887) ; Hoitt v. Hoitt,
63 N.H. 475, 3 Ail. 604 (185); In Te Hunt, 81 Me. 275, 17 Ati. 68 (1889); Hutlett
v. Carrey, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N.W. 31, 34 L.R.A. 384 (1896); contra, Morgan v. Ireland,
I Idaho 786 (1880).
Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 544, 52 P.2d 1219 (1935).
Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 546, 52 P.2d 1219 (1935).
Burns v. Burns, 67 Wyo. 314, 224 P.2d 178 (1950).
In re Ray's Estate, 287 P.2d 629 (Wyo. 1955).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 58-216 (1945).
In re Cadwell's Estate, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 Pac. 499 (1920).
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be subsequent to the will of the adopting parent, it is likely that the
adopted child would be viewed as a natural child in the application of the
doctrine of implied revocation.
In Wyoming, the illegitimate child will inherit from the mother, but
in order that he may inherit the same as one born in wedlock the parents
must subsequently intermarry, and the child must be recognized after such
marriage by the father to be his illegitimate child. 43 Applying this statute
to a set of facts wherein the testator has executed a will prior to birth of
the illegitimate child and the child is later made an heir by fulfilling the
requirements of this statute, there would be such a change of circumstances as would at common law and by a majority of the states be sufficient
to impliedly revoke the father's will. If the father executed his testament
in this situation after the marriage but prior to his recognition of the
child, then the will would not be revoked as the recognition factor would
be analogous to a birth of issue, and by applying the rule of the Burns case
such is not considered a sufficient change to revoke a will by operation
of law.
The doctrine of implied revocation has full play in Wyoming, and in
the absence of legislation the court has the power to decide what subsequent changes in the testator's "circumstances," whether they be pertinent
to domestic, moral, or other heretofore unrecognized legal duties, shall be
held to revoke his will. In the Ray case we are said to have adopted the
common law rule that a pretermitted heir will not be allowed a share in
the estate against the will. The court, noting Wyoming's uniqueness in
not having some statutory provision regarding the pretermitted or afterborn child, proceeded with caution in proclaiming that rule, though it is
contra to the overwhelming authority of other states. However, the court
did follow the majority of states in holding that in Wyoming a woman's
will is not revoked by her marriage. The court, after considering the
numerous changes in the testator's circumstances in the Johnston case,
the first case of implied revocation in Wyoming, closed that decision with
these words: "We do not hold that every new moral obligation has the
effect of revocation. The rule is not as broad as that. It has its limitations.
It depends on the circumstances." Yet a testator in executing his will is
obliged at his peril to conform to the word of the statute, 44 but such compliance may be in vain if the circumstances, of which he had no premonition, are found to effect an implied revocation. This uncertainty, in a
realm where certainty is needed, can be made certain by legislative action.
Such action should define what change of circumstances will or will not
revoke a testament by the operation of those statutes. Or, the legislation
may direct what persons should be entitled to share in the testator's estate
regardless of the intent expressed in the will. Legislation of such a nature
would remove the undesirable element of uncertainty and would guide
43.
44.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 6-2507 (1945).
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 6-304 (1945).

NOTES

both the advising attorney and the testator when questions arise regarding
implied revocations. No revocation should be permitted except on such
grounds as are specifically named in the statutes and these grounds should
be as few as possible.
RICHARD

A.

TOBIN

SOME ASPECTS OF THE LAW OF FIXTURES IN WYOMING
Fixtures are chattels annexed to real property which retain their
separate identity and become realty, but which under certain circumstances
may become personalty again.' Generally the annexation is in permanent
form and the chattel becomes an integral part of the real estate. However,
physical permanency is not always required to allow the chattel to become
2
a part of the realty.

Although the first paragraph above will serve the purpose of a broad
general statement it would be well to consider a quote from a 1931
Nebraska case: 3 "Perhaps there are no subjects in law more difficult to
deal with than the questions raised as to fixtures ....

The cases are legion;

and each new case seems only the more to disturb any fixed or certain
rule that seemed deductible from former cases." Fixtures are not exclusively a landlord-tenant problem but can also arise in controversies
between heir and executor; owner and his vendee; owner and mortgagee;
owner 'and trespasser; and owner or mortgagee and a conditional vendor.
The rule of the common law was that whatever is once annexed to the
freehold becomes part of it and cannot be removed except by the party
entitled to the inheritance. 4 This rule was never strictly followed in
America, and the following tests were laid down in an early American case
to determine whether the property be a fixture or not:5
1. Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto.
2. Appropriation to the use or purpose of that part of the realty with
which it is connected.

3. The intention of the party making the annexation, to make the
article a permanent accession to the freehold-this intention being
inferred from the nature of the article affixed, the relation and
situation of the party making the annexation, and the purpose or
use for which the annexation has been made.
But no precise rule can be laid down which will govern all cases as to
whether it is a chattel or a fixture. This can vary with the intention of
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N.W. 659, 77 A.L.R. 1381 (1931).
Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am.Dec. 634 (1851).
Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N.W. 659, 77 A.L.R. 1381 (1931).
Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 137.
Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 59 Am.Dec. 634 (1851).

